EXCLUSIVITY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S CAUSE OF ACION:
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT REMOVES SOME OF THE EXPANSIVE VIEwS
FOUNDATIONS IN ZICHERMAN V. KOREAN AIR LINES Co., LTD.

Brian S. Tatum*

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight KE007 left Alaska's
Anchorage International Airport bound for Seoul, South Korea En route,
the plane strayed into Soviet airspace and was shot down by a Soviet SU-15
interceptor aircraft over the Sea of Japan.' The location of the wreckage
placed the flight more than three-hundred nautical miles off course All
269 passengers were killed including Muriel Kole.4
Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother,
respectively, sued Korean Air Lines in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.5 They based part of their suit on Article 17
of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention).6 The Judicial Panel on
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'Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629, 631 (1996).
1d.
3 Id. The nautical or geographic mile contains 6,080 feet, as opposed to 5,280 feet in a
regular mile, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 992 (6th ed. 1990).
4 Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 631.
Id.
6 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides the rule of liability for the death or
2

injury of passengers. The official American translation of Article 17, as employed by the
Senate when it ratified the Convention in 1934, reads as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a
passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.
The authentic French text of Article 17 reads as follows:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre lision corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est produit Abord de l'aeronef ou au
cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de dabarquement.
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Multidistrict Litigation transferred Zicherman and Mahalek's case along with
all other federal court actions arising out of the disaster to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia for trial on the common issues of
liability.7 The jury for the consolidated case found that the "willful
misconduct" of the flight crew caused the crash and awarded $50 million in
punitive damages to the plaintiffs. Normally damage recovery under the
Warsaw Convention is limited to $75,000 under the Montreal Agreement
which modified the Warsaw Convention.8
However, where willful
misconduct is found, Article 25 lifts this cap on damages.9
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
jury's finding of willful misconduct, but set aside the punitive damages
award, holding that such damages are not recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention. 10 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then remanded
the individual cases back to their courts of origin to determine the amount

Id.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502;
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Done at The Hague on
28 September 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
7 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 575 F. Supp. 342 (J.P.M.D.L. 1983).
8 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and Hague
Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, Approved by Executive Order E-23680, May 13, 1966
(Docket 17325) (1966), reprinted in Civil Aeronautics Board, Aeronautical Statutes and
Related Material 515-16 (1974) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
9 Warsaw Convention, supra note 6. The text of Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention
as ratified by the Senate in 1934 provides as follows:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the Court to which the case is submitted, is
considered to be equivalent to misconduct.
Id.
The official French text of Article 25(1) reads as follows:
Le transporteur n'aura pas le droit de se prevaloir des dispositions de
la presente convention qui excluent ou limitent sa responsabilit6, si le
dommage provient de son dol ou d'une faute qui, d'apres la loi du
tribunal saisi, est considdr6 comme equivalente au dol.
Id.
'0 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
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of compensatory damages."
At Zicherman and Mahalek's trial in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Korean Air Lines moved for a determination that the
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) limited dependent survivor's recovery
to pecuniary losses.' The district court denied the motion. 3 According
to the court, where a treaty such as the Warsaw Convention conflicts with
a prior statute such as DOHSA, the treaty prevails.14 Relying on In re Air
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland,5 the court held that in construing the
Warsaw Convention, federal courts must look to, apply, and develop federal
common law. 6 Since the court found that the Warsaw Convention has as
its underlying purpose the awarding of a full recovery in cases where there
has been a finding of willful misconduct, 7 it held that the plaintiffs could
recover damages for their loss of society, which are non-pecuniary in
nature.1
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that federal common law governs
causes of action under the Warsaw Convention.' 9 The circuit court
disagreed, however, with the district court's application of federal common
law which would apply a different rule to accidents on the high seas than to
accidents on land, such as the crash in In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie,
Scotland (Lockerbie).2° Since a uniform law should govern all Warsaw
2
Convention cases, according to the circuit court, general maritime law, '
which was already the established rule for accidents on land under the

"Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 116 S. Ct. 629, 631 (1996).
12 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768. A pecuniary loss is a loss of
money, or of something by which money or something of money value may be acquired.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1131; see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,
ADMMALTY AND MARrrImE LAW 465-80 (1994).
13Korean Air Lines, 807 F. Supp. at 1078.
'4 Id. at

1088.

In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub
nom Rein v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 502 U.S. 920 (1991).
16 Korean Air Lines, 807 F. Supp. at 1078; Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1278-79.
7 Korean Air Lines, 807 F. Supp. at 1087-88.
"' Id. at 1080-88.
19Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., 43 F.3d 18, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1994).
D Id.
21 General maritime law is a branch of federal common law that furnishes the rule of
decision in admiralty and maritime cases in the absence of preemptive legislation.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 12, at 95.
'5
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Lockerbie case, should determine the damages recoverable. 22 However,
because only dependents may recover damages for loss of society under
general maritime law,' the court of appeals vacated the award, holding that
Muriel Mahalek was not a dependent of the decedent, and remanded the case
back to the district court to determine whether Marjorie Zicherman was a
dependent.2 4
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,' and on January 16, 1996,
the Court handed down its decision in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
Ltd. (Zicherman).2 6 Unlike the District Court for the Southern District of
New York and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court refused to recognize or create a federal common law applicable to all
cases under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.27 The Court held that
in a suit brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier
is liable only for those damages recoverable under the law that would
normally govern in the absence of the Warsaw Convention.' Under the
Court's interpretation, Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention merely limits
the amounts of damages recoverable under the law applicable under the
forum's choice of law rules.29 Since the plane crashed on the high seas
beyond a marine league3" from the shore of any state, the crash fell within
the scope of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), which does not
allow the recovery of loss-of-society damages. Thus, the Court reversed the
plaintiffs' recovery for their loss of society.31

2

Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 21-22.

23Id. at 22. Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1092 (2d Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp. 894 F.2d 804, 81112 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling Co. 770 F.2d 455 (5th Ci. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S. Ct. 1205 (1986); but see Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 914-17
(9th Cir. 1994).
' Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 22.
2 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 115 S. Ct. 1689, (1995).
'6 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
27 id.

Id. at 636.
" Id. at 637.
30 A marine league is a measure of distance commonly employed at sea, being equal to
one-twentieth part of a degree of latitude, or three geographical or nautical miles. BLACK's
LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 967.
31 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 116 S. Ct. 629, 637 (1996).
2
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. History of the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention governs the international carriage of passengers,
baggage, and cargo by air and limits the liability of international air
carriers.32 The Convention was the result of two international conferences

held in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929. 33 The interim Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJ), a permanent
committee of air law experts created by the Paris Conference, did the work
on drafting the Warsaw Convention.'
With over 120 signatories, the
Warsaw Convention is one of the most widely recognized international
35
agreements today.
Two main policies underscore the Warsaw Convention. First, realizing
that air travel traverses national boundaries and involves varying languages,
customs and legal systems, its drafters wanted to provide some uniform laws
for international air transport. 6 Second, the Convention's drafters limited
the liability of the air carriers to 125,000 francs or approximately 8,300
dollars to help promote the growth of an industry in its infancy.37
The United States did not participate in the original drafting of the
Warsaw Convention by the CITEJ; however, the United States acted quickly
thereafter.3 ' The Senate consented to the Convention on June 15, 1934, and
the United States officially joined the treaty on October 29th of that year. 9
Because improvements in air safety in the years following the Warsaw
Convention's creation allowed air carriers to obtain low cost insurance, many
32

Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The
Elusive Search for the French Meaning of Lesion Corporelle, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 127, 129
(1990).
33Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967).
3 id.
35 Sisk, supra note 32, at 129; ELMAR GIEMULLA ET AL., WARSAW CoNvENTroN 3
(1992); see RENE H. MANYmEwicz, THE LIABILITY REGaE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR
CARRIER, 231-34 (1981) (listing the parties to the Warsaw Convention).
36 Jean-Paul Boulee, Note, Recovery for Mental Injuries That Are Accompanied by
Physical Injuries Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: The Progeny of Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 501, 502 (1995).
37Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 499.
3 Id. at 498.
39 Boulee, supra note 36, at 503.
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of its signatories, including the United States, began to believe that air
carriers no longer needed special protection.'
Thus, the parties to the
treaty met at the Hague in 1955 to consider its revision.4 The result was
the Hague Protocol which increased the limit on air carrier damages to
$16,600.42 However, the United States opposed the new limit on damages
43
believing that it was still too low and refused to adhere to the Protocol.

Because it seemed unlikely that the U.S. Senate would ever ratify the
Hague Protocol, and without the Protocol's ratification U.S. citizens would
remain subject to the $8,300 limit of the original 1929 Convention, the
United States gave its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention on
November 15, 1965. 44 However, a Department of State press release issued
that same day stated that the United states would consider withdrawing its
denunciation if the Warsaw Convention's signatories would agree to
increasing the limit on liability in international air transport to around
$100,000 per person.45 In response, the other contracting states called a
special meeting in Montreal to convince the United States to withdraw its
impending denunciation.'
A compromise resulted in the Montreal
Agreement which raised the limit on air carrier liability to $75,000. 47 As
a quid pro quo for the United State's acceptance of a limit less than
$100,000,48 the Montreal Agreement abolished the negligence standard of

the original Warsaw Convention and replaced it with a new policy of
liability without fault on the part of the carrier.49 This theoretically would
provide for quicker and less expensive settlements, with less money going
to litigation.50 Because of the compromise, the United States withdrew its
notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention on May 13, 1966.1

40

Id. at 504.

41 Id.

at 503.

42 Id.

43 Id.

' Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 551.
41Id. at 552.
46
47

Boulee, supra note 36, at 504.

Id.

48 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 590-591.
49 GEMLu.LA, supra note 35, at 2; Boulee, supra note 36, at 504.
o Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 600.
s Boulee, supra note 36, at 504.
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B. The Ambiguity of the Warsaw Convention's Provisions
The Warsaw Convention has caused confusion in the United States
because it does not explicitly address what types of damages a party may
recover against an air carrier, who has the right to bring suit or what are the
rights of the parties who are allowed to bring suit.52 The Warsaw Convention merely places conditions on the air carrier's liability and a cap on the
amount of recoverable damages." The grey areas in the Warsaw Convention are due to the fact that most of the delegates at the Warsaw Conference
were civil law attorneys.'M In civil law countries, the Warsaw Convention
does not cause any confusion because the general law of civil liability in
contract
or tort automatically provides a cause of action that fills in its grey
55
areas.

Most common law countries have dealt with the problem by enacting
special legislation that implements the Convention and provides a cause of
action which fills in its grey areas. 56 In the United States, on the other
hand, Congress has failed to provide legislation to implement the Warsaw
Convention. 57 However, the Supreme Court has held that the Warsaw
Convention operates as a self-executing treaty which does not require any
implementing legislation by the signatories. 58 Thus, ever since the Warsaw
Convention's ratification, U.S. courts have struggled with the question of
how they should fill in the Warsaw Convention's grey areas.
C. Recognition That the Warsaw Convention Created a Cause of Action
In the 1950s, two federal court cases in the Second Circuit avoided the
problem of filling in the Warsaw Convention's grey areas by holding that the
Warsaw Convention did not create an independent cause of action.59 In

52 Floyd Brantley Chapman, Note: Exclusivity and the Warsaw Convention: In Re Air

Disasterat Lockerbie, Scotland, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 493, 497-99 (1991-1992);
MANKIEWICZ, supra note 35, at 155-56.
53 Id.
54Id.
55 Id. at 161; GEORGETTE MILLER, LiABLrY iN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 231-32
(1977).
56 MANKIEwiCz, supra note 35, at 161.
5 Id. at 162; see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 519.
58Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franildin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).
59 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 517-518.
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Komlos v. CompagnieNationaleAir France(Komlos), the court held that the
effect of the Warsaw Convention was merely to create a presumption of
liability against the air carrier, leaving it to local law to grant the right of
action.' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit implicitly affirmed
this part of the Komlos opinion by not addressing the question on appeal.6 1
A few years later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly
endorsed the Komlos rule in Noel v. Limea Aeropostal Venezolana (Noel).62
In subsequent Warsaw Convention cases, U.S. courts either assumed or
must be founded on some law other than the Warsaw
decided that a claim
63
Convention itself.
Eventually, the Second Circuit reversed itself in Benjamins v. British
European Airways (Benjamins)." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recognized that its holding in Noel had become the rule not
only in the Second Circuit, but also in others as well.' Nonetheless, after
considering the French text of Article 24, the methods Britain and Canada
used to implement the Warsaw Convention, and the benefits of the
Multidistrict Litigation Act, the Second Circuit reversed its rule under
Noel.6 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this issue
directly,67 the Second Circuit's conclusion that the Warsaw Convention
creates a cause of action is universally accepted.6 However, the question
of how a court should fill in the Warsaw Convention's grey areas once again
became a problem.

60111 F. Supp. 393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.

1953).
61

P.P.C. Haanappel, The Right to Sue in Death Cases Under The Warsaw Convention,

6 AIR LAW 66, 77 (1981).
6 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
63 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 519.
4 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1977).
65Id. at 919.
6 Id. at 918-19.
67 Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's Wingspan Over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of
Recovery, 59 J. Am L. & CoM. 587, 591-92 (1994).
" Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 737 F.2d
456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985); In re Mexico City Aircrash of
October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 412 (9th Cir. 1983).
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D. Restrictive and Expansive Views on Whether the Warsaw Convention's
Cause of Action is Exclusive
After Benjamins, courts have also struggled to decide whether the Warsaw
Convention's cause of action is exclusive or non-exclusive." Neither the
Warsaw Convention itself nor any congressional act expressly mandates that
the Convention preempts state law claims.7 ° It is clear that the Warsaw
Convention preempts state laws with which it is in direct conflict because of
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.7 1 However, the exclusivity
issue is whether the Warsaw Convention goes one step further and implicitly
preempts all state law causes of action when the state claim falls within the
scope of the Convention. 72
The non-exclusivity or restrictive approach interprets the Warsaw
Convention to allow state causes of action alongside Warsaw Convention
causes of action for cases falling within the scope of the Convention.73
Most of the courts holding that the Warsaw Convention's cause of action is
not exclusive rely on the "however founded" language of Article 24(1). The
text of Article 24 as ratified by the Senate in 1934 provides as follows:
(1) In the cases governed by articles 18 and 19 any action
for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.
(2) In the case covered by article 17 the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to
the questions as to who are the persons who have the right
to bring suit and what are their respective rights. (emphasis
added).74

69

Ras, supra note 67, at 591-92.

72

id.
Ras, supra note 67, at 591-92.
The official French text of Article 24 reads as follows:
(1) Dans les cas prdvus aux articles 18 et 19 toute action en responsabilitd, A quelque titre que ce soit, ne peut etre exerc e que dans les
conditions et limites prdvues par la pr6sente Convention.
(2) Dans les cas pr6vus A I'article 17, s'appliquent 6galement les
dispositions de l'alinda prdcdent, sans prejudice de la determination des
personnes qui ont le droit d'agir et de leurs droits respectifs.

7o Id. at 499.
71U.S. Const. art.
7

74

VI.
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The courts adopting the non-exclusivity approach argue that the "however
founded" language of Article 24(1) means "whether founded on the Warsaw
Convention or some other law. ' 5 Under this interpretation, the Warsaw
Convention merely provides the exclusive remedy and preempts inconsistent
remedies provided for under state law causes of action.76 Therefore, a
plaintiff can use a state law cause of action in areas covered by the Warsaw
Convention, but the damages recovered by the plaintiff cannot exceed the
Warsaw Convention's cap on damages.
From a practical standpoint, when a passenger dies in an air crash, the
$75,000 cap is quickly reached under the plaintiff's non-Warsaw Convention
causes of action.77 Thus, under the restrictive approach, courts often avoid
the debate over how to fill in the Warsaw Convention's grey areas.78
However, in cases such as Zicherman where "willful misconduct" is found
and the cap on the amount of recoverable damages is lifted, the Warsaw
Convention's grey areas once again become a problem even for the
restrictive approach.
Courts adhering to the exclusivity or expansive approach focus on the
Warsaw Convention's purpose of uniformity rather than the text of the
Convention. 79 According to the exclusivity approach, the subject matter
addressed by the Warsaw Convention demands uniformity vital to national
interests such that allowing state regulation would frustrate national
purposes.80 Thus, the scheme of the Warsaw Convention is so pervasive
that a court may infer that Congress implicitly preempted all state law in the

Warsaw Convention, supra note 6.
71In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979 708 F.2d 400, 414 n.25 (9th Cir. 1983);
Clark v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1209, 1211 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Alvaraz v.
Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 756 F. Supp. 550, 554 (S.D. Fla. 1991); In re
Aircrash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 660 F. Supp. 1202, 1221 & n.43 (W.D. Ky.
1987); Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
76 See Alveraz v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A., 756 F. Supp. 550, 554 (S.D.
Fla. 1991) (distinguishing exclusive remedy of the Warsaw Convention from the suggestion
that it provides the exclusive cause of action).
77Ras, supra note 67, at 498.
71 See
79In

id.

re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1275
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Rein v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 502 U.S. 920
(1991); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Amer. World Airways, Inc;, 737 F.2d
456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985); Valasquez v.
Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 747 F. Supp. 670, 675-77 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
goSee Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1274-75.
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areas covered by the Convention.81
To justify their conclusion, the courts that have adopted the exclusivity
approach describe a parade of horrors that would occur if state law causes
of action were allowed alongside Warsaw Convention causes of action.
According to the exclusivity approach, allowing state law causes of action
would destroy certainty because an air carrier could predict neither the
choice of law rules nor the substantive law that a court would apply in cases
falling within the scope of the Warsaw Convention. 2 Moreover, allowing
state law causes of action would destroy uniformity because inconsistent
verdicts could be reached in separate cases for similarly situated passengers
on the same flight.8 3 Further, allowing state law causes of action would
open the floodgate for forum shopping."
Since it would not make much sense to hold that the Warsaw Convention
preempts all state law causes of action arising under it due to the interests
in national uniformity and then to adopt state law to fill in the Warsaw
Convention's grey areas, some courts that have adopted the exclusivity
approach have held that federal common law should decide such issues.8 5
The U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on the question of whether the
Warsaw Convention's cause of action is exclusive. 6 However, in Zicherman, the Court rejected the Second Circuit's holding that federal common
law supplied the compensatory damages to be applied in an action under the
Warsaw Convention cases.8 7
III. ANALYSIS
In Zicherman, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the problem of
filling in one of the Warsaw Convention's grey areas-what damages are

a' Id.
12

Id. at 1275.

31d. at 1275-76.

Valasquez, 747 F. Supp. at 676.
" Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1278; see Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 43 F.3d 18,
21-22 (2nd Cir. 1994); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073,
1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
" The U.S. Supreme Court has twice declined to answer the question as to whether the
Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive cause of action for cases falling within its scope.
See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392
(1985).
s Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 629, 636 (1996).
84
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recoverable under Article 17. In answering that question, a unanimous Court
held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only
for those damages that would apply in the absence of the Warsaw Convention under the forum's choice of law rules."8 Although the Court did not
address the exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention, its interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention removes some of the foundations supporting the
expansive approach. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the
language of Article 24, the negotiating and drafting history of the CITEJA,
and the post-ratification understanding of the contracting parties.8 9
In interpreting the meaning of "dommage" as used in the official French
text of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on the language of Article 24. 90 According to the Court, "damage,"
in its broadest sense, applies to an extremely wide range of phenomena for
which no legal system in the world would provide tort compensation. 9
Thus, the court concluded that the term "dommage" embraces only "legally
cognizable" harms.9
The next question is under which legal system "legally cognizable" is to
be defined. According to the Court, there are only two thinkable answers to
this question.93 First, "dommage" could mean those harms that French law,
in 1929, recognized as legally cognizable, which included not only
"dommage materiel" (pecuniary harm) but also "dommage moral" (non-pecuniary harm, including loss of society).'
In rejecting this alternative, the
Court found it implausible that the contracting parties intended to adopt the
precise rule applied in France about what is a legally cognizable harm by
their mere use of the French language.95
The second alternative, according to the Court, is that Article 17 leaves it
to adjudicating courts to specify what harm is cognizable." The most
natural reading of Article 24, according to the Court, is that, in an action
brought under Article 17, the Warsaw Convention does not affect the
substantive questions of who may bring suit and what damages they may be

88 Id. at 637.
89Id.
90 Id. at 632-33.
91Id. at 632.
92

id

93id.
9 Id. at 632.
" Id. at 633.
9 1&
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compensated for. Those questions are to be answered
by the domestic law
97
states.
contracting
the
of
courts
the
by
selected
The Supreme Court also found support for its conclusion that domestic
law determines the damages a party can recover under the Warsaw
convention in the negotiating and drafting history and the post-ratification
understanding of the contracting parties. First, after examining the drafting
history of the Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens
des Experts (CITEJA), which did the preparatory work for the two
conferences that produced the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Convention did not resolve the questions of who may
recover, and what compensatory damages they may receive, but rather left
the answers to these questions to "private international law" (conflict of
laws). 98 Second, since some countries have adopted domestic legislation
to govern the types of damages recoverable in a Convention case, the Court
concluded that the post-ratification conduct of the contracting parties
illustrates that domestic law governs the recoverable damages. 99
After holding that the domestic law selected by the courts of the
contracting states determines the types of damages recoverable under the
Warsaw Convention, the court discussed which particular law of the United
States would provide the governing rule. Although the Supreme Court has
the power to implement a self-executing treaty,""' the Court refused to
develop a federal common law rule to apply to all Warsaw Convention
causes of action stating that this is a job for Congress.'' Instead, the
Court held that Articles 17 and 24(2) provide nothing more than a pass97 Id. at

634.

98 Id. at 634-35 (1996).

In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the

CITEJA Report accompanying the 1929 draft of the Convention which states as follows:
The question was asked of knowing if one could determine who the
persons upon whom the action devolves in the case of death are, and what
are the damages subject to reparation. It was not possible to find a
satisfactory solution to this double problem, and the CITEJA esteemed
that this question of private international law should be regulated
independently [sic] from the present Convention.
Id. at 635 (quoting Henry de Vos, Report of the Third Session of CITEJA (Sept. 25, 1928),
reprinted in SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW
MINUTES, WARSAW 1929, 255 (R. Homer & D. Legrez transl. 1975)).
Id. at 635.
100 Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Cf. Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
'' Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
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through, authorizing courts to apply the law that would govern in the
absence of the Warsaw Convention under the forum's choice of law
rules. ' 0
IV. CONCLUSION

Those arguing in favor of exclusivity claim that making the Warsaw
Convention's cause of action non-exclusive undermines the Convention's
purposes of uniformity and certainty. To justify implicitly preempting all
state law causes of action falling within the scope of the Convention, the
exclusivity approach describes the parade of horrors that would occur if state
law causes of action are allowed alongside Warsaw Convention causes of
action. However, under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention, the forum court must turn to the law applicable under its choice
of law rules to determine what damages are available under Article 17. This
interpretation allows the entire parade of horrors in cases involving the
Warsaw Convention's wrongful death provision-Article 17: Air carriers
will not be able to predict the applicable law in a wrongful death case
against it; families of victims can forum shop; also, different courts can reach
inconsistent verdicts for the families of victims involved on the same flight.
Thus, although the Supreme Court did not expressly address whether the
Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive cause of action for actions falling
within the Convention's scope, its reasoning in Zicherman removes some of
the foundations underlying the exclusivity approach's arguments in favor of
implicit preemption of state law causes of action.

102 Id.

at 635-36.

